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[Tarp Rygos ir Penango. Pilietybës sàvokos ir kultûriniø
skirtumø pripaþinimas Latvijoje ir Malaizijoje1]
Santrauka
Straipsnyje lyginami du pilietybës modeliai. Analizë atskleidþia, kaip ðios dvi skirtingos realios abstrakcijos veikia
socialiná gyvenimà. Ðiame straipsnyje, uþuot apibendrinus pilietybës sàvokà, siekiama pabrëþti complex dialectic, t.
y. sàveikø, kurios yra visø etnokultûriniø santykiø pagrindas, sudëtingumà, nusakant kiekvienà didelës etnokultûrinës
ávairovës iðraiðkà. Pilietybës sàvoka daþnai vartojama kaip tautybës ir nacionalinës kilmës sinonimas, ypaè Vakarø
Europoje. Pastaruoju laikotarpiu ði sàvoka, ið esmës vartojama politinëje filosofijoje ir teisëje, pasidarë populiari ne
tik politologijoje, bet ir sociologijoje bei antropologijoje. Socialiniai mokslai „atrado“ pilietybës sàvokà tada, kai
staiga ir netikëtai atsikûrë tautinës valstybës Centrinëje ir Rytø Europoje ir prasidëjo tariama Vakarø Europos krizë.
Taigi pilietybës sàvokos nagrinëjimas turëtø padëti spræsti problemas, susijusias su istoriniø arba teritoriniø maþumø
statusu Centrinëje ir Rytø Europoje bei imigrantø padëtimi Vakaruose.
Pilietybei daþnai priskiriama suvienijimo ir átraukimo (inclusion) funkcija. Dël tokio poþiûrio susiformuoja vargu
ar tikroviðkas pilietybës vaizdinys, nes daþnai ji laikoma kone brolybës, lygybës, sutarimo ir pan. sinonimu. Sociologiniu
poþiûriu pilietybës kaip harmoningos politinës bendruomenës iðraiðkos pateikimas yra nelabai tikëtina abstrakcija.
Pilietybë turi bûti suvokiama kaip antagonistinis procesas plëtojantis varþyboms, átampai, konfliktams, taip pat ir
nuolatinëmis deryboms bei kompromisams tarp grupiø, átrauktø á kovà dël to, kad bûtø pripaþintos jø teisës ir
skirtumai. Pilietybës sàvokos raidos nagrinëjimas sociologiniu aspektu atskleidþia tai, kad nëra bendrosios pilietybës
teorijos. Juo labiau, kad istorinës struktûros ir esencialistinës (essentialized) kultûros konstrukcijos yra pernelyg
skirtingos, kad galima bûtø plëtoti tokià teorijà ir bendràjá pilietybës modelá. Taèiau pilietybiø modeliø lyginamoji
analizë yra gana ádomi ir naudinga.
Ðiuolaikinë Latvija ir Malaizija, kurdamos savo valstybingumà, pasirinko skirtingus pilietybës modelius. Latvijos
1991 m. Pilietybës ástatymas rëmësi tautinës valstybës (Staatsnation) doktrina, pagal kurià linkstama nuslopinti
bet kokius kultûrinius skirtumus nacionalinës teritorijos viduje. 1956 m., pasibaigus Britanijos koloniniam
dominavimui, Malaizija, pasirinko multinacionalinës pilietybës modelá, kuris akivaizdþiai pagristas ðalies etniniø
skirtumø garbinimu. Ilgametis lauko tyrimas (fieldwork) Rygoje ir Penange, paremtas nagrinëjama pilietybës sàvoka
ir su ja susijusia pripaþinimo politika (politics of recognition), leidþia pateikti tokias iðvadas dël Latvijos ir Malaizijos.
Antroji Latvijos nepriklausomybë yra reprezentatyvus atvejis, atskleidþiantis, kaip tautinës valstybës (Staatsnation)
principas ir susijusi pilietybës sàvoka buvo vël ágyvendinti, sakytume,  ðiurkðèiu arba ortodoksiniu bûdu. Ðiuolaikinës
Latvijos tautinimas vyko veikiant Pilietybës ástatymui, kurio pagrindu ið ðio proceso buvo paðalinti kiti. Tokia
iðskirtinës tautybës galia lëmë naujø ribø tarp etniniø blokø atsiradimà ir atitinkamai – paraleliniø visuomeniø –
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Introduction: sociological aspects
of citizenship
The term citizenship, which is often used as
a synonym of nationality and national affilia-
tion particularly in Western Europe, is essen-
tially a concept used in political philosophy and
jurisprudence. In this context, we should also
add political sciences.
If we exclude Thomas H. Marshall’s classic
study Citizenship and Social Class, we can rea-
sonably contend that citizenship is not part of
sociology and anthropology’s established ter-
minology. In fact, in these two fields the no-
tion of citizenship has come up only recently
with the researches of Rogers Brubaker, Louis
Dumont, and Immanuel Todd (Marshall, 1949;
Dumont 1991; Brubaker 1992; Todd 1994).
Furthermore, social science’s discovery of the
notion of citizenship must be viewed mainly in
relation to the sudden and unexpected come-
back to the national State in Central-East Eu-
rope and its alleged crisis in Western Europe.
The term’s present popularity in sociology and
anthropology would then be the upshot of prob-
lems concerning the status of historical or ter-
ritorial minorities in the Old Continent’s Cen-
protrûká. Jeigu artimiausiu metu Latvija norës atitikti Europos Sàjungos reikalavimus, ji susidurs su keliomis
problemomis: pirmiausia – su ribø tarp etniniø blokø ir paraleliniø visuomeniø panaikinimu, paskui – su adekvaèiu
skirtumø pripaþinimu (recognition of difference).
Pastaruoju metu Malaizijoje bendrø susitarimø, átvirtintø konstitucijoje, naujos ekonominës politikos, Vizijos
2020  vertinimai gerokai pakito ir daþnai buvo prieðtaringi, ypaè dël etniðkai diferencijuotos pilietybës ir
multikultûralizmo politikos. Taèiau nepaisant daugybës spragø ir bendrø susitarimø trûkumø, dinamiðkas, sumanus,
darbingas balansas buvo iðlaikytas. Ypaè turint omenyje tai, kad etniðkai diferencijuotos pilietybës politika garantavo
nacionaliná etniniø komponentø susitelkimà ir parodë vertikaliàjà socialinæ stratifikacijà dël labai nevienodø
ekonominiø galimybiø. Galima teigti, kad tokia politika yra ne tik ekonominës sëkmës prielaida, bet keli pamatai
vadinamajai padoriai visuomenei (decent society).
Malaizija gali atrodyti kaip Latvijos alternatyva. Nacionalinio tapatumo konstravimas ir pilietybës sàvoka buvo
paremta etninio pliuralizmo ir multirasinës kultûros (multiracialism) idëja. Multirasiðkumas kaip Malaizijos valstybës
ákûrimo mitas ir pilietybë sulaiko ávairias bendruomenes nuo radikalaus nacionalizmo. Taèiau multirasiðkumo
mitas iðlaikë ir átvirtino ribas tarp bendruomeniø. Taigi galima áþiûrëti etninio tapatumo esencializacijà
(essentialization), kuri paskatino susidaryti etninius blokus.
Latvijos ir Malaizijos atvejai rodo, koks abstraktus ir netinkamas yra mono ir multi ðalininkø ginèas. Ið tikrøjø
mono ir multi prieðprieða rëmësi nekorektiðkomis prielaidomis su radikaliai dualistiniais aspektais, tarsi visas gëris
arba blogis bûtø tik vienoje pusëje. Siekiant iðvengti mono ir multi bipoliariniø spàstø, kalbant apie pilietybës
koncepcijà turi bûti nagrinëjami reiðkiniai su prieðdëliu inter arba trans. Latvijos ir Malaizijos atvejis pabrëþë
prieðprieðos tarp konstruktyvizmo ir esencializmo  beprasmiðkumà. Naudingiau ne apsistoti ties ðia dichotomija, o
analizuoti socialinius procesus, vedanèius link tapatumo konstravimo esencializacijos, netgi pasitelkus tokiø
konkreèiø abstrakcijø kaip pilietybë institucionalizavimà.
tral-East, and the immigrants’ condition in the
Western area.
We have noticed that over the last twenty
years social science has taken up new concepts,
proving that notions and questions regarding
certain fields have quietly slipped into others,
as highlighted by Prigogine and Stengers
(Prigogine and Stengers 1979). The Dutch an-
thropologist Don Kalb has aptly analyzed why
social science nowadays employs terms such
as citizenship, trust, social capital, civil society
etc. more often, although they are not custom-
ary in this field. This author has rightly noticed
that social science’s researchers must learn how
to tackle the concrete abstractions produced by
the international community, global organiza-
tions, national institutions, public and private
consulting agencies, political and economic
élites, etc. (Kalb 2002; 22). Consequently, so-
ciology and anthropology must analyze how
these concrete abstractions occur in empirical
reality and which social processes and mecha-
nisms they imply or induce.
Citizenship is undoubtedly one of the most
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fundamental concrete abstractions produced by
philosophers and jurists. It is particularly in-
teresting for sociologists and anthropologists
as a phenomenon that structures collective rep-
resentations and social relations amongst indi-
viduals and groups. In other words, social sci-
ence is concerned with citizenship mainly as
an imagined construction that essentializes in
social life. Though not a complete survey, we
would like to present some major sociological
aspects of citizenship, aside from the philo-
sophical or juridical ones.
As stressed by the Italian sociologist
Umberto Melotti, in the first place we must
emphasize that citizenship is a juridical status
granting a sum of rights and duties to mem-
bers of a specific political entity (Melotti 2000;
35). Usually, this means a modern State, but
we should not be too categorical on this point.
In fact, we should remember that in a distant
past there was a commonly accepted notion of
citizenship quite similar to the present one; for
example, the poleis in ancient Greece, Repub-
lican Rome, and the Italian medieval Comuni.
Moreover, nowadays there are notions of su-
pranational if not transnational citizenships as
in the EU.
The notion of citizenship is definitely un-
like that of subjection. The former involves a
relation of reciprocal loyalty between an im-
personal institution and its members. The lat-
ter instead, in force especially in absolute mon-
archy regimes or in multicultural empires -the
well-known Vielvölkerstaaten- implies a person-
alized relation of obedience and submission of
subjects to the sovereign. As Melotti notes,
having rights (civil, political, social etc.) and
not privileges differentiates citizenship from
subjection (Melotti 2000; 35). In Weberian
terms, we can add that citizenship is a typical
phenomenon of legal-bureaucratic political sys-
tems while subjection pertains to traditional and
charismatic ones. Using the terminology intro-
duced by the Austrian historian Otto Brunner,
we can remark that citizenship is a phenom-
enon related to the development of the
intitutioneller Flächenstaaat, while subjection is
an indication of the Personenverbandsstaa
(Brunner 1968; 188 ff.). Obviously, these dis-
tinctions are modeled on ideal types according
to the Weberian meaning of the term.
Over the past two centuries, the notion of
citizenship has undergone an evolution stud-
ied by T. H. Marshall observing the United
Kingdom (Marshall 1949). This analysis, which
however must not be overly generalized, re-
veals how the rights of citizenship have ensued
following a specific course. At first, civil rights
concerning individual freedoms (personal free-
dom, freedom of thought and religion, besides
the right to fair and equal justice for all)
stemmed from the ascent of the middle classes
in the 18th century. Afterwards, also due to the
rising proletariat’s social struggles, political
rights, i.e. rights concerning the exercise and
control of political power through the right to
vote, were established in the 19th century. Fi-
nally, social rights, i.e. rights ensuring a degree
of welfare and safety through welfare and edu-
cational services, were guaranteed in the past
century. As explicitly or implicitly observed by
authors of both communitarian (Taylor 1992)
and liberal (Kymlicka 1995) background, a
fourth type of right was added over the last
twenty/thirty years; namely, cultural rights.
Amongst these in particular there is the right
to maintain and hand down to one’s descen-
dants cultural identity, ethnic affiliation, and
religious belonging. Indeed, the heated debates
regarding the politics of recognition and the
vague and inchoate idea of multiculturalism
concern the assertion or negation of these
rights. Citizenship is a social process that takes
place under specific historical conditions. Per-
manent dynamic is therefore one of its most
crucial characteristics.
Cultural rights’ recent unfolding in the con-
stantly ongoing citizenship debate should not
be regarded merely as being induced by the glo-
balization or economic and political integra-
tion of vast areas that were once divided if not
opposing. As far as Europe is concerned, the
fact that cultural rights have been added only
recently to the debate on rights concerning citi-
zenship must also be viewed as a delayed mani-
festation due to the persistence of some ele-
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ments of the continent’s political-institutional
structure. We should remember that forms of
citizenships in which cultural rights are ac-
knowledged d’emblée have been achieved in
other parts of the world. We will deal with this
later, analyzing the case of Malaysia.
The delay we have mentioned, which must
be assessed for what it is, i.e. a matter of fact
and not a lack, a shortcoming or even a fault,
involves the principle of Staatsnation, a Ger-
man term of French origin. This principle, which
has characterized the Old Continent’s history
from the 19th century on – as stressed by Swiss
historian Urs Altermatt and French jurist
Stephane Pierré-Caps – may be summarized
as follows: each nation must have its own State
with its own territory and each State must com-
prise one nation (Altermatt 1996; 53; Pierré-
Caps 1995; 56). According to common sense
and most theoretic representations, a
Staatsnation is almost invariably conceived as
a Kulturnation as well, i.e. a community whose
members share the same cultural traits, par-
ticularly the same idiom. Paradoxically however,
this corresponds roughly both to the Herderian
idea of Volk, whose main characteristic is a
shared language for all its members, and the
French concept of nation, in which the linguis-
tic criteria is again a major feature, as defined
by the Académie franšaise as well, in 1694. Ac-
cording to this definition, a nation comprises
“tous les habitants d’un meme Etat, d’un meme
pays, qui vivent sous les memes lois et usant de
la meme langue” (Lochak 1988 ; 77). If we
should venture to draw some conclusions from
these observations, we could reasonably assume
that the Staatsnation principle postulates the
formation of politically sovereign monocultural
and/or monoethnic territorial spaces. We could
challenge that the Staatsnation idea is based
on cultural and/or ethnic purity.
This consideration seems backed by count-
less historical details, which can be neither
specified nor analyzed in detail in this context.
However, we can say that from the 19th cen-
tury on, i.e. since the Staatsnation principle was
applied in Europe, there have been repeated
efforts to make the single national territories
both ethnically and culturally more homoge-
neous. To this day, these processes of ethno-
cultural recomposition in the name of the
Staatsnation, have been a dreadful and ongo-
ing series (as the Kosovo warns us!) of bound-
ary revisions, forced assimilations, banish-
ments, planned immigrations, deportations,
ethnic cleansings and wars, genocides, blood-
stained secessions, etc. The inability and tre-
mendous reluctance to face the problem of
cultural and/or ethnic difference, i.e. the mi-
nority issue, within almost all national Euro-
pean States over more than a century and a
half, should therefore be ascribed to the con-
crete abstraction of the Staatsnation. We should
remember that to this day, as shown by the
paradigmatic example of the Minderheitenschutz
(minority protection) developed after WW I,
there have usually been measures guarantee-
ing an unstable and unwilling tolerance with-
out achieving a true recognition of difference
(Veiter 1984; Vol.1, 20-29).
As Rogers Brubaker illustrates, the notion
of citizenship in Europe is closely related to
the political organization of the national States
that have more or less applied the Staatsnation
principle. Consequent to Brubaker’s reason-
ing, we can determine the following points. The
national State has far too often been under-
stood exclusively as a geographic expression.
Its sociological characteristics have repeatedly
been left out. More particularly, the fact that
the national State is a political association of
citizens who belong to it even because of their
cultural traits, which are either ascribed or
vested accordingly, is often disregarded. Not
everyone can indiscriminately belong to a spe-
cific national State and, to take a well-known
formula of Max Weber, we can say that the
national State is an association partially open
towards the outside. Naturally, this limited
opening towards the outside, i.e. towards the
other or towards the foreigner, entails the cre-
ation of institutional mechanisms of social se-
lection that regulate affiliation and exclusion
(Brubaker 1992) Citizenship and nationality
represent the fundamental tools that define who
has the complete right to belong to a national
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State and who is excluded from it.
Specific institutions, such as the naturaliza-
tion process, notions as assimilation and sym-
metric concepts as entitled nation and minor-
ity, have been established especially to make
this strict logic of inclusions and exclusions
pertaining to the principle of Staatsnation more
flexible. Almost intrinsically reckoned as cul-
turally other, a foreigner can obtain citizenship
through naturalization and assimilation, which
coincidentally presuppose more or less volun-
tary processes that a sociologist would call ac-
culturation processes and therefore a cultural
affiliation change. Usually though, the foreigner
has to forsake his previous citizenship, while
the dual citizenship, though becoming juridi-
cally more widespread, is still regarded as odd
if not dangerous for the preservation of na-
tional identities (consider the controversial
debate in Germany). As far as minorities are
concerned, we can say that they are granted
citizenship d’emblée. However, the difference
between entitled nation and minority implies a
structural asymmetry, which conceals a partial
exclusion and therefore a demarcation between
first and second class citizens. Finally, as high-
lighted by Stéphane Pierré-Caps, there is a le-
gitimate suspicion that granting citizenship or
other rights to minorities by a State is chiefly a
strategy to reserve a droit de regard on what
happens to the State’s minorities in bordering
States (Pierré-Caps 1995; 46-50). Overall,
once again we feel that, according to the
Staatsnation logic, cultural difference within a
State still denotes an irksome anomaly.
At this point, we ought to highlight that,
with few exceptions, the debate on citizenship
until now has been quite ethnocentric and/or
more specifically Eurocentric.  We can there-
fore agree with E. Isin when he stresses the
Orientalistic perspective of many theoretical
reflections on citizenship (Isin 2002; 117 ff.).
Until now, these studies have focused mainly
on societies and States commonly known as
Occidental, whose democratic calling, rightly
or not, is never or no longer challenged.
United States of America, Canada, and Aus-
tralia, and West European nations, especially
France, Germany, and Great Britain, are the
subject of several social science researches,
while the other parts of the world are practi-
cally forgotten or at least overlooked quite of-
ten.  Such an Orientalistic perspective calls forth
representations in which citizenship is an ex-
clusively Occidental prerogative, while the other
societies cannot attain it for want of moral vir-
tues and/or rational qualities. US anthropolo-
gist Robert Hefner has rightly stressed that non
-Occidental societies have their own history and
thus their own specific way of facing the chal-
lenges concerning the difficult relation between
citizenship and cultural plurality (Hefner 2001;
3). A sociology and anthropology of citizen-
ship wishing to avoid Orientalistic perspectives
can no longer avoid the comparative aspect.
However, this means the Occidental agenda
based on liberal principles and ideals can no
longer be regarded as the only valid one. There-
fore, we must also understand the sociological
circumstances that generated the various an-
swers to the problem of relationship between
citizenship and the right to difference, though
complying with the basic norms of justice, in-
dividual freedom, and deliberative democracy
(Hefner 2001; 4).
Finally, we must add that citizenship has
often been ascribed a unifying and inclusive
function (Isin 2002; 117). This view has pro-
duced hardly realistic representations of citi-
zenship, which has far too often been regarded
almost as a synonym of brotherhood, equality,
harmony, agreement, etc. Sociologically, view-
ing citizenship as the expression of a harmoni-
ous political community is a hardly creditable
abstraction. Citizenship must be perceived as
an agonistic process with competition, tensions,
conflicts, as well as permanent negotiations and
compromises between the groups involved in
the struggle for the recognition of their rights
in general and those of difference in particu-
lar.
In the next part of this article I will com-
pare by contrast two almost antithetical mod-
els of citizenship and analyze how two differ-
ent concrete abstractions influence social life. I
have chosen Latvia and Malaysia, where I am
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still directing two field studies particularly in
two cities: Riga and Penang. My choice has a
pragmatic reason. After its second indepen-
dence, Latvia has introduced a model of citi-
zenship in 1991, following the Staatsnation
doctrine that tends to stamp out any form of
cultural difference within its national territory.
Malaysia, after the end of the British colonial
domination in 1956, has given itself a model of
multicultural citizenship, which is unmistakably
based upon the celebration of difference
amongst the country’s various ethnic compo-
nents.
Citizenship in Latvia: the comeback of the
Staatsnation. The case of Riga
The outbreak of the Second World War was
the beginning of an especially painful chapter
in Latvian history. It triggered an epoch of
socio-economic changes in the country, which
transformed the entire pre-war ethno-cultural
structure. This process began during the Na-
tional Socialist occupation, when the influen-
tial Jewish community, apart from those who
managed to flee, was annihilated. Still notori-
ous today are both the ghetto, set up in Riga,
and Kaiserwald concentration camp, the dread-
ful place of extermination in a park at the edge
of the city (Vestermanis 1996; 62 seq.). The
subsequent Stalinist Sovietization policy, which
not only meant the establishment of a politi-
cal-bureaucratic apparatus on the Communist
model, the collectivization of all sectors of the
economy and forced industrialization, but also
the expulsion of the Baltic Germans, the large-
scale deportation of politically suspect Latvians
and their replacement by Soviet citizens from
the core republics of Russia, Ukraine and
Belarus, contributed decisively to recasting the
ethnic make-up of the region.
The Stalinist mobility policy continued long
after Stalin’s death, even if the goals had
changed. The settlement of Slav incomers in
the Soviet Republic of Latvia and particularly
in Riga was carried on for economic and mili-
tary reasons almost until the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Thus between 1959 and 1979
the Latvian population of the Latvian Soviet
Republic declined by 9%, while the Slav share
(Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians) in-
creased by 9% during the same period. The
change was particularly macroscopic in Riga
(Schlau, 1990: 238). Here the proportion of
non-Latvian inhabitants became so large that
it became a small majority even to this day. In
this context, we must add that citizens of the
non-Baltic republics regarded migration to
Latvia as a privilege, above all because work-
ing conditions and quality of life were better
than in the remainder of the Soviet Union. To
be transferred to Latvia and especially to Riga,
the Baltic city with the Western atmosphere,
was a dream for many Russians, Belarussians,
and Ukrainians, which they tried to realize at
any price. Hence, it is not surprising that un-
der the conditions of Soviet mobility policy –
as confirmed by the statistical data – Riga de-
veloped into a binational city. It was essentially
composed of two parallel societies, which lived
separately from one another and ignored one
another: the Latvians and the Slavs (mainly
Russians). The Latvians felt the increasing pres-
ence of immigrants as an unacceptable super-
imposition and simultaneously a dangerous
threat both with respect to ensuring socio-eco-
nomic opportunities and their socio-cultural
identity preservation. This was not only be-
cause the Russian, Belarussian, and Ukrainian
immigrants got privileged treatment from the
almost omnipotent Soviet local bureaucracy,
which itself consisted largely of foreigners and
was regarded as the administration of the oc-
cupiers. Under the protection of Soviet power,
the immigrants did not feel obliged to familiar-
ize with and respect Latvian specificity. In ev-
eryday life they could act as if the Latvians were
a quantité negligéable up to the period of so-
called perestroika in the 1980’s, when a very
cautious and ambivalent recognition of Latvian
identity became apparent among the Soviet
rulers. Learning the local language or taking
an interest in the native society and culture was
not heeded necessary. The Soviet mobility policy
in Latvia, with its underlying and at the same
time paradoxical aim of creating a homo
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sovieticus through Russification, in fact estab-
lished the ideal conditions for that polarization
and confrontation between ethnic groups that
can be observed in Latvia today.
Latvia’s second independence not only
meant re-introducing free market economy and
Western-style parliamentary democracy, but
also the inflexible adherence to the idea of an
ethnic Staatsnation, with no regard for the
country’s particular ethnic structure. Its re-
establishment hardly represents a royal road
to Europe, where meanwhile attempts are be-
ing made to carefully reconsider this institu-
tional form of political community. It is, rather,
a case of a nostalgic return to the past or – to be
more precise – of a return to the 19th century.
In Latvia, the present-day public discourses of
identity and ethnicity of the reborn entitled
nation sound an explicitly archaic and Roman-
tic note, in which the attentive observer can
find echoes of Herder. Concepts as Volk
(people), Volksgeist (spirit of the people), and
Volksseele (soul of the people) are customary
again (Giordano 2000; 121).
At the same time, the territorial principle is
exalted and the spatial claims of the nation are
consequently accorded a vital importance. The
aim of the establishment of the Staatsnation
principle in Latvia, and the specific ethnicity
discourses that go along with it, is to revitalize
the theme of monoethnic territoriality - all offi-
cial protestations with respect to the recogni-
tion of cultural otherness or minority rights
notwithstanding. This occurs largely via lan-
guage, which once more proves to be a major
symbolic identity resource. At present around
40% of Latvia’s population and more than 50%
of Riga’s population is of Slav origin. Since
1994 however, laws have been repeatedly passed
in parliament, or proposed, which authorize the
Latvian language alone, even in commercial
transactions (cf. article 7 of the proposed lan-
guage law of 1995, which has meanwhile been
dropped after massive pressure from the Eu-
ropean Union and Russia). A police authority,
the Language Inspection Board, was even set
up to protect the Latvian language. Especially
in Riga, it strictly supervises the maintenance
of linguistic obligations. These measures natu-
rally also provided for the Latvianisation of the
whole educational system, with the result that
Russian-language schools were treated as a sort
of discontinued model. Closure was delayed
until the last students had taken their final ex-
aminations. At the same time a radical and
meticulous correction or removal of bilingual
road signs, shop signs, and street names of the
Soviet period, took place in Riga. Anything that
bore testimony to the Russian language or
Cyrillic was carefully removed or erased.
In conclusion, we must add that the new
élites would undoubtedly have taken much
stricter language policy measures, had it not
been for the constant admonitions of the Eu-
ropean Union and the brusque warnings of
Latvia’s large and powerful neighbor.
At present, in the name of the nation state
and the monoethnic nation state, sections of
the population, which were in part born in the
country (50% of non-Latvians belong to the
second or third generation of Slav immigrants)
are being deliberately ethnicized, principally
through the language criterion, in order to
refuse them citizen rights and exclude them
from civil and economic society. Whoever does
not belong to the state nation, has no political
rights, and is barred from practicing important
professions, for which the linguistic standards
required by the law are especially stringent. An
observant look at the current situation in Riga
and Latvia shows that the establishment of the
monoethnic nation state principle has created,
in European terms, a unique category of state-
less persons, which makes up more than one
third of the whole population, and which is of-
ficially, and somewhat hypocritically, described
as permanent resident. Provided with a special
passport, they are branded as non-citizens. Two
alternatives are open to them:
(re-)migration to the ethnic motherland that would
amount to soft ethnic cleansing, which is indeed what
the Latvian authorities intend and hope for, or more
or less compulsory assimilation into the entitled na-
tion.
The case of Latvia and especially that of Riga
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shows how with Soviet occupation, under the
guise of Communist internationalism and on
behalf of an undeclared Greater Russian na-
tionalism, the pre-war period multiculturalism
was systematically weakened. The rigid, almost
obsessive adherence to the Staatsnation prin-
ciple after the second independence, has con-
tinued to dampen or prevent the development
of a politics of recognition, which could have
guided negotiations on the acknowledgement
of the various identities both at the institutional
level and in everyday life. Up to now, Latvia is
still very far indeed from accomplishing that
accommodation between ethnic communities
with equal rights or that “integration without
assimilation” postulated by Asbjoern Eide,
president of the UN working group on minor-
ity rights, (Eide 1997; 7-19).
However, everyday intercultural relations
between members of the various ethnic groups
have become much less tense in comparison
with the early nineties. Despite a citizenship
model that does not recognize or tolerate eth-
nic difference, intercultural communication in
Riga between members of the different paral-
lel communities is beginning to be a perceptible
reality at level of everyday life contacts.
Citizenship in Malaysia: from plural
society to multiracial nation. The case of
Penang
When we talk about plural societies, we use
a term introduced by John S. Furnivall, an acute
British colonial administrator known until now
for his analyses regarding the structure of so-
cieties in Burma, Indonesia, and implicitly
Malaya (including Singapore).
According to this author, a plural society is
characterized by two or more elements or so-
cial orders which live side by side, yet without
mingling, in one political unit (Furnivall 1944;
446).
For Furnivall, the only circumstance link-
ing these different social orders or, better yet,
ethnic communities sharing the same territory,
is economy and, more specifically, the sheer
exchange of goods.  The predominant relation
among the various groups was therefore mate-
rial, entirely utilitarian, and lacking a social and/
or symbolic tie bearing witness to common val-
ues and ultimately a shared identity. Accord-
ing to Furnivall, this link based exclusively on
economic considerations, and not on common
values, mutual solidarity, and fellow-feelings, is
weak and quite unpredictable however, as far
as a society’s cohesion is concerned.  Plural
societies are practically fated to be social con-
figurations in which a generalized warfare
reigns, since the indiscriminate pursuit of per-
sonal economic profit is not curbed by a shared
citizenship framework (Furnivall 1944; 451).
For these reasons, social disorganization and
political uncertainty constantly threaten plu-
ral societies. From a current point of view,
Furnivall’s position can certainly seem ques-
tionable
Furnivall apparently disregards that plural
societies in the end are the upshot of European
political engineering. This means that actually
these specific social configurations are the de-
liberate outcome of British and Dutch domi-
nation in the region. The British and Dutch
colonial systems, certainly not so innocently,
established their power especially in Southeast
Asia by applying the divide et impera principle.
Therefore, creating parallel societies based on
spatial segregation and on the construction of
an inevitable ethnic difference was an effective
way of governing, legitimated by the rhetoric
of having to be there to prevent the worst.  In
the last part of the above-mentioned excerpt,
we can detect this philosophy of necessity even
in Furnivall, although he was very trenchant
about some racialist representations upheld by
colonial administration top men. Furnivall’s
assumption was that colonizers had come upon
plural societies on their arrival, as these had
always existed in that area (Hefner, 2001: 6).
The exact opposite is true instead because co-
lonial power had urged immigration policies,
especially for the Chinese and the Hindu, which
deeply altered the aspect of societies in exist-
ence before the Europeans’ arrival.
To illustrate the above, we need only men-
tion the Chinese community in Malaysia, pri-
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marily the one in George Town (Penang).
George Town, by now known as Penang, was
founded in 1786 for strategic reasons by the
British East India Company on the island of
Pulau Pinang (at the northern entrance of the
Strait of Malacca). Penang, formerly renowned
as the Pearl of the Orient and now renamed Sili-
cone Island because of its active electronics
sector, enjoyed an immediate economic suc-
cess.  Between 1786 and 1819 on several occa-
sions the British not only tolerated but also en-
couraged immigration coming from all over the
world (Chinese, Indians, Burmese Malay, Thai,
Javanese, Bugis from Sulawesi, Aceh from
Sumatra, as well as Armenians and Jews, etc.).
However, even after 1819 when growth slowed
down due to the trade decrease caused by com-
petition with Singapore and the drop of inter-
national prices for pepper, Penang was still a
sought-after destination for potential immi-
grants. In fact, George Town’s population rose
from 6,000 inhabitants in 1820 to 29,000 in
1824.  In 1851, the city already numbered
43,000 that became 60,000 in 1860. After this
date, Penang enjoyed another phase of eco-
nomic growth favored by the opening of the
Suez Canal (1869) and the extensive introduc-
tion into Southeast Asia of the Hevea
brasiliensis, i.e. the India rubber tree.  For Brit-
ish Malaya, and primarily Penang, this meant a
striking sequence of succeeding migratory flows
from all over China and southern India. Be-
tween 1860 and 1915 Penang became one of
the most important platforms from which im-
migrants then spread throughout the region to
work on India rubber plantations or, more spe-
cifically, in Malaya’s zinc mines.  Again, colo-
nial administration strongly encouraged the
influx chiefly of Chinese and Indians.  The
former were held in high esteem for their pre-
sumed Confucian ethic, while the Hindu (es-
pecially of Tamil origin), due to their diligence
and honesty, were considered quite useful
people (Leith 1804; 25).  These positive repre-
sentations must be juxtaposed to the negative
ones concerning the autochthonous population,
i.e. the Malay, who had a terrible reputation
among the British, as the following passage
written by one of Penang’s earliest governors
proves:
“The proportion of the Malay inhabitants is fortunately
very small [at Penang, Chr. G.]
as they are indolent, vindictive treacherous people …
incapable of any labour beyond the cultivation of pady
and fit for little else but cutting down trees (Leith 1804; 25).
However, within the remarkable range of
motherlands of those who came to Penang,
China is undeniably the greatest supplier of
immigrants. In colonial times they were a very
heterogeneous group from both a social and a
cultural, i.e. religious and linguistic, point of
view.  Besides social disparities within the com-
munity that sprang from different causes linked
both to the time of arrival and the previous sta-
tus in the society of origin, the George Town
Chinese belonged to five creeds (Buddhist,
Taoist, Confucian, Muslim, and Christian), and
at least eight linguistic groups (Küchler 1968;
89). Therefore, it would be deceptive and mis-
leading to speak about a close-knit national
community in a period that includes the entire
19th century and the first decades of the 20th
century.
During the first half of the 20th century how-
ever, with the impending decolonization led
mainly by the British, the Chinese in the entire
area, particularly in Malaya and the Straits
Settlements (Penang, Malacca, and Singapore),
underwent a process of ethnonationalization.
Basically, this evolution towards the shaping
of a community with a distinctly ethnic quality
is the result of three conditions. The political
engineering of British colonial rule, which, as
already mentioned, aimed at encouraging the
ethnicization of all the different so to say na-
tional groups in the Malay protectorate terri-
tory and in the far more geographically limited
one of the Straits Settlements.
The direct or indirect influence of the pow-
erful nationalist movements that rose in the
first part of the 20th century especially in main-
land China. We should recall that Sun Yat Sen
went to Malaya and lived in Penang for a short
while, and that his well-restored house is one
of the city’s most popular lieu de mémoire, es-
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pecially for the Chinese community.
The corresponding and more or less simul-
taneous self-ethnicization of the other numeri-
cally more relevant groups (Malay and Indian),
already begun in the mid-nineteenth century
by the respective political and intellectual élites
chiefly with a British background or trained in
Britain. Therefore, the ethnicization of the
Chinese cannot be conceived without consid-
ering the construction and spreading of the
concepts of bangsa and kebangsaan melayu. The
former means race in a very restrictive and ex-
clusive sense and the latter Malay nationality
with a more inclusive sense, therefore contem-
plating acculturation, actually assimilation,
and, from a legal standing, the naturalization
of the other (Milner 1998; 153-165; Shamsul
1998; 138-142).
Being bangsa or kebangsaan melayu meant
above all being Muslim and then speaking a
specific language and sharing certain customs
such as the complex wedding ceremonies that
fundamentalist groups nowadays forcefully re-
ject as unislamic. These processes of simulta-
neous self-ethnicization, especially in the last
phase of the colonial period, clearly reveal one
group’s strong fears of another group’s poten-
tial supremacy (Milner 1998; 156 ff.).
Through these three ingredients, we can ob-
serve what Dru Gladney has called the making
majority of the Malays to which we need to add
the making minorities of the Chinese and Indi-
ans  (Gladney 1998; Milner 1998; 163 ff.).
While decolonization was becoming increas-
ingly viable, one could detect a process of crys-
tallization and consequently of essentialization
of ethnicity which would engender the almost
dogmatic representation of what is known with
a touch of irony as the ethnic trinity comprising
Malays, Chinese and Indians. This trinitarian
view is still one of the sociopolitical myths on
which present-day Malaysia is based.
If this reconstruction of the progressive
shaping of a plural society in Malaya is cor-
rect, then we can say that on the verge of inde-
pendence the founding fathers of this State
based on the relics of British colonial rule had
to face societies in which ethnicity permeated
economic, social and political relations at all
levels of the public sphere, i.e. from the na-
tional to the local and daily one. This implies
that these social configuration, very close to
plural society’s ideal type, were characterized
by a spatial separation among the system’s vari-
ous groups, each with its institutions and in-
frastructures; a division of labor on an ethnic
basis which corresponded to social inequality
among individuals. Especially in Malaya, there
was a strong correlation between ethnic belong-
ing, social status and economic standing
(Shamsul 1998; 142). We shouldn’t overlook
that even within each group, due to obvious
socioeconomic inequalities among people, we
can detect a specific layered structure.
To illustrate this reality we will take another
look at the city of George Town at the brink of
decolonization. The Chinese lived mainly in
their specific districts and most of them, who
were mainly businessmen, shop-keepers and
artisans, lived and worked in the city’s center,
i.e. the renowned Chinatown. Sources indicate
that within George Town’s Chinese districts
there was a correlation between place of origin
and occupation (Küchler 1968; 92 ff.). Thus,
the Cantonese were chiefly goldsmiths, barbers,
carpenters, and construction hands, while the
Hokkien’s fields were boat and shipbuilding,
India rubber and fish commerce. The Hokkien
along with the Hainanese and the Hokchiu also
worked in catering. The Teochews and Hakka
were chiefly farmers, but the latter were almost
the sole owners of pawnshops. Finally, the
Henguas mainly dealt with tire and auto repairs
(Küchler 1968; 93).
The Indians (prevalently Tamil), if they were
not working and living on India rubber planta-
tions outside the urban center, lived in their
own district still known as little India and their
activities are mainly small businesses, the most
conspicuous being textiles retailers (Küchler
1968; 100).
George Town Malays instead lived in
kampong on the outskirts of the city and were
employed in farming, especially in rice grow-
ing (Küchler 1968; 103 ff.). In 1957, Britain
definitively withdrew from the Malay peninsula
K u l t û r o s   i r   p o l i t i k o s   s o c i o l o g i j a
71
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2003/2, ISSN 1392-3358
and the three Straits Settlements (Singapore,
Malacca, and Penang). Its place was taken by
the independent Federation of Malaya (re-
named Federation of Malaysia in 1963). Be-
cause of its ethnic diversity, the new country
faced the difficult problems of choosing a suit-
able model of statehood and citizenship. Two
concepts were developed in this context: a
Malayan Malaysia and a Malaysian Malaysia,
strongly backed above all by Singapore’s élites
(Hill and Lian 1995; 60). The first model stood
for a classical nation state asset with the Malays
as the entitled nation, in which the other groups
were allowed, at best, the role of national mi-
norities. Within the framework of the discus-
sion of a Malayan Malaysia, the question was
even raised whether granting citizenship to
Chinese, Indian and other immigrants or na-
tive groups (for example the Dayak of Sarawak)
was appropriate. From the start, even the way
in which the issue of the non-Malay’s statute
was presented highlights that the equivalence
between nationality and citizenship (so famil-
iar to us) was implicit in the concept of Ma-
layan Malaysia. The idea of a Malaysian Ma-
laysia on the other hand, proposed a more open
and inclusivist concept of nation and citizen-
ship, as Bellows aptly points out:
A Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and the
state is not identified with the supremacy of any particular
community or race (Bellows 1970; 59).
This model therefore took into account the
polyethnic and/or multicultural structure of the
country and acknowledged all ethnic groups on
the federation’s territory at independence as
members of the political community with equal
rights. After fierce debates, a very cautious
variant of Malaysian Malaysia was at last agreed
upon. But on what type of interethnic negotia-
tions is the latter version based upon?
The constitution of 1957 represents the core
of a consociative-like identity bargaining that
has created a very specific type of ethnically
differentiated citizenship (Hefner, 2001: 28)
based upon the fundamental distinction be-
tween natives, i.e. Malays, and immigrants, i.e.
non-Malays. Since the Malays are economically
and professionally the most disadvantaged
group, they have been granted a special statute
concerning economy, education, and property
rights (especially about the land). They have
specific territories reserved to them, special
regulations with respect to commercial licenses
and concessions, and quotas in higher educa-
tion (see articles 89, 152 and 153 of the Con-
stitution of Malaysia). Non-Malays (in particu-
lar Chinese and Indians) were granted full
Malaysian citizenship as well as some rights of
religious and linguistic expression within a secu-
lar State in which Islam however is the State
religion. This institutional compromise, as two
experts of this region as Milton J. Esman and
Robert W. Hefner have aptly pointed out, is
the outcome of defensive strategies that can
be ascribed to reciprocal fears and mistrust,
which still characterize Malaysian society’s dif-
ferent ethnic communities (Esman 1994; 57 ff.;
Hefner 2001; 23).
Which fears troubled the different ethnic
communities? The Malays, being bumiputera,
i.e. sons of the earth and therefore natives, were
afraid that, due to their obvious socioeconomic
inferiority, they would be overcome by the
Chinese and Indian enterprise and suffer the
miserable plight of North American red Indi-
ans as some members of their élites stated lit-
erally (Esman, 1994: 53). The non-Malays in-
stead worried about the future of their flour-
ishing economic activities and their cultural
identity in a State with a strong Islamic conno-
tation.
At this point, we need to add that within
the framework of this constitutional compro-
mise public life goes on respecting ethnic-reli-
gious boundaries. In view of these boundaries,
non-Malays have nearly tacitly accepted the
political preeminence of the Malay community
in exchange for their own economic supremacy.
This is why Arend Lijphard speaks about hege-
monic consociationalism in Malaysia (Lijphard,
1977: 5). However, consider that this asym-
metry is far from complete, or speaking about
consociationalism would be misleading. In fact,
the federal government has always been a coa-
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lition of three ethnic parties, the Nasional
Barisan. Moreover, it is not unusual that rep-
resentatives of the Malaysian Chinese Associa-
tion (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Con-
gress (MIC) serve as ministers, although key
ministries are always held by representatives
of the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO). Therefore, the office of Prime Min-
ister is customarily entrusted to a Malay. How-
ever, he must be able to be acknowledged as a
leader by all communities, prove he can play
the role of great mediator is case of interethnic
conflicts that could trouble the nation’s unity.
Over the years, the compromise elaborated
by the constitution has proven obsolete and on
several occasions new forms of negotiated
agreements have changed the character of
Malaysian ethnically differentiated citizenship.
Despite contrasts and permanent tensions
among the various communities, a collegial and
consensual solution has always been reached.
Thus, after the May 1969 ethnic riots, a New
Economic Policy was launched granting further
social rights to Malays whose socioeconomic
situation over the twelve years of independence
had worsened compared to middle and higher
strata, which mainly include non-Malays
(Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman 1990; 17 ff.;
Gomez, 1999; 176 ff.).
In 1991, after a period of sensational and
dizzying economic growth, which, apparently
at least, somewhat lessened social differences
between Malays and non-Malays, the coalition
government launched the project Vision 2020
whose principal goal is to finally establish a
bangsa malaysia, i.e. a united Malaysian na-
tion with a sense of common and shared destiny
(Hng 1998; 118). Politically, this will mean
bringing about a consensual, community-ori-
ented democracy (Hng 1998; 118) guarantee-
ing the existence of a tolerant society in which
Malaysians of all colours and creeds are free to
practise and profess their customs, cultures and
religious beliefs, and yet feeling that they belong
to one nation (Hng 1998; 119).
Practically, this means that even in the fu-
ture Malaysia will be a pluriethnic and/or mul-
tiracial entity based on the consensual separa-
tion between natives and immigrants. However,
the concept of citizenship becomes more in-
clusive through the concept of bangsa Malay-
sia that joins the various communities into a
single civic body. Finally, through the pursuit
of excellence, Vision 2020 introduces a less eth-
nic and more meritocratic idea of citizenship.
Under this aspect, Malaysia resembles
Singapore’s model of nation based on the com-
bination of two founding myths, i.e.
multiracialism and meritocracy (Hill and Lian,
1995: 31-33). Under these very complex po-
litical-institutional auspices, quite specific
forms of intercultural coexistence were devel-
oped locally and in everyday life, as the example
of Penang clearly shows.
Today George Town is a city of more than
220,000 inhabitants (60% Chinese, 30% Malay
and 10% Indian) in the middle of one of
Malaysia’s most important industrial centers
(tin industry). While the old basic structures
and divisions of the colonial plural society have
not completely disappeared, they have weak-
ened. Today we would look in vain for the old
spatial separation between the ethnic groups,
which used to characterize the settlement pat-
tern of George Town so clearly: it no longer
exists. Those Chinese who have become
wealthy, have moved away from the old town,
taking up residence in luxurious detached
houses or apartments in the better districts. The
Indians, who today have mixed with the remain-
ing Chinese in the old town, have taken their
place. The Malays have in part left their
Kampong-like districts, and live in cheap apart-
ment blocks along with members of other eth-
nic groups. The division of labor produced by
the plural society is very far from being as rigid
as it was in the past. Many Indians, having been
successful in trade, now belong to the affluent
middle class. Many Malays as well have risen
considerably on the social ladder. Neverthe-
less, the Chinese remain very much the domi-
nant economic group. Because of social mo-
bility, which has led to a labor shortage in low
status jobs, Penang has once more become a
place of immigration. Thus, until the Asian
crisis of 1997-98, migrants mainly from Indo-
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nesia and Burma worked for small and large
companies in the industrial and service sectors
subject to very precarious contracts.
The transformations in the social structure,
which, as already mentioned, significantly al-
tered the plural society inherited from British
colonial rule, have not destroyed the tolerant,
though not unproblematic, co-existence be-
tween ethnic groups. An American observer,
who compares the atmosphere in Penang with
that in the USA, bears witness to that. In the
introduction to her book, she writes - with a
degree of naive optimism:
“It is the work of a native New Yorker for
whom urban racial tensions seem all too nor-
mal and who found in Penang, where diver-
sity and harmony are not mutually exclusive,
a sense of hope” (Hayes Hoyt 1997;  vii).
The exoticizing and/or orientalizing gloss on
the actual situation in Penang displayed in this
text cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, it is a fact
that in Penang the spirit of accommodation and
identity bargaining – while retaining, of course,
porous ethnic boundaries, spatial divisions, and
social strategies of distancing – which the Ma-
laysian constitution evokes, is very evident. This
may be illustrated not only by the frequent in-
termarriages or the educational system, which
allows a broad linguistic pluralism particularly
in private schools, but also by so-called
multicultural local policies regarding public self-
representation and hence also the preservation
of architectural and historical monuments.
Thus, it is no coincidence that the munici-
pal museum was opened in 1997 with an exhi-
bition bearing the memorable title: “They came
to Penang from all over the world”. An accom-
panying catalogue was also published, in which
the historically developed ethnic-cultural diver-
sity was deliberately enacted. It is difficult to
avoid the impression that both in the exhibi-
tion and in the catalogue there is an over-em-
phasis on the multiculturalism of Penang. For
example, there is a pronounced and somewhat
nostalgic expression of good will towards eth-
nic and cultural differences that belong more
to the past than to the present. In this case
multiculturalism is first of all conceived and
then celebrated with something of a sense of
mission. The whole enterprise of the exhibi-
tion and the catalogue is intended to underline
Penang’s multiculturalism as a fundamental
value and a virtue and not as a deficit. Conser-
vation policy conveys the same message. For
more than ten years - after a modernization
phase typical of the Southeast Asia countries,
in which with an iconoclastic fury all remind-
ers of the past were destroyed or left to rot
(cf., for example, the destruction of Singapore’s
old Chinatown) - the historical inheritance,
above all in the shape of old buildings, is being
increasingly valued. Thus in Penang guidelines
have been formulated for the restoration of the
most important buildings (houses, temples and
mosques). It is interesting to discover that this
conservation policy was once again based on
the principle of accommodation and identity
bargaining. The monuments to be restored were
carefully chosen according to criteria that could
be described as multicultural. The symbolically
most appropriate and aesthetically most rep-
resentative buildings for the history and cul-
ture of the Chinese, Malay or Indian commu-
nity were chosen as worthy of restoration, con-
sidering the ethnic composition of Penang. The
conservation of historic monuments can there-
fore be regarded as the result of skilful nego-
tiation, ultimately producing an ingenious ar-
rangement that helps avoid the latent and al-
ways impending struggle for recognition between
the three ethnic groups constituting the soci-
ety of Penang.
Conclusions
With reference to the concept of citizenship
and the possible politics of recognition associ-
ated to it, what can we determine from two such
diverse cases as Latvia and Malaysia?
The second independence of Latvia is a rep-
resentative case of how the Staatsnation prin-
ciple, as well as the notion of citizenship con-
nected to it, have been reintroduced in a so to
speak crude or orthodox way. The comeback
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of the Staatsnation principle in Latvia (and also
in Estonia), with its particular discourses and
practices of citizenship, aims at revitalizing the
“monoethnic territory” ideal rather rigidly,
despite official pronouncements regarding the
recognition of minorities’ rights. Such meticu-
lous efforts to achieve a monoethnic State, may
be explained by the traumatic experiences of
foreign rule under the Soviet Union. The al-
ready mentioned wave of Russian immigration
to the Baltic area, which aimed at the region’s
Russification and provided quite favorable
working conditions for immigrants with good
professional qualifications, was undeniably per-
ceived by the native as “occupation” or “domi-
nation”. Viewed from a sociological standpoint,
the situation could be described as the instal-
lation of a foreign dominant class on top of the
existing social structure: a situation that re-
mained unacceptable to the native. It is also
possible that the Soviet annexation of Latvia
and the other Baltic States had no basis at the
level of international law because it was based
on the supplementary secret protocols from
the Hitler-Stalin Pact. This was declared “le-
gally invalid and void from the moment of its
signing” by the Commission for the political and
legal assessment of the German-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact of 1939, appointed in 1989
by the Soviets. The outcome however was that
almost three generations of immigrants could
be legally stigmatized as occupants with no right
to citizenship. Certainly all these consider-
ations have a legal basis and a psychological
explanation. Nevertheless, from a sociological
viewpoint, Latvia at present is a country whose
society, due to specific concrete abstractions,
has been ethnicized by decree excluding the
other. Such a power of the exclusive ethnicity has
caused a fresh outbreak of the boundaries be-
tween ethnic blocs and therefore of parallel
societies. Finally, we need to highlight that, be-
sides ethnic separation, there is also a condi-
tion of political disparity and socio-economic
stratification.
If in the near future Latvia should wish to
be compatible with the EU, it will have to face
the problem of abating ethnic blocs and paral-
lel societies in the first place, and then the prob-
lem of an adequate recognition of difference. This
could be achieved even by changing the national
State’s framework; i.e. by modifying the con-
cept of citizenship through the principle of
subsidiarity and promoting consociational de-
mocracy structures based on power-sharing, as
suggested for example by the political scientist
Arend Lijphart (Lijphard, 1995: 275 seq.). Of
course, this does not imply that problems re-
garding interethnic and intercultural coexist-
ence are solved at last and can be dispatched.
Assessment of the consensual agreements
anchored in the constitution, the NEP, and the
Vision 2020, have varied greatly and were of-
ten contradictory, particularly concerning the
politics of ethnically differentiated citizenship
and multiculturalism. Some authors emphasize
that the different negotiations led to the su-
premacy of the Malays, which amounted to the
unadulterated political hegemony of the Malay
community over the Chinese and Indian
(Shamsul, 1998: 145 ff.). Other political com-
mitted experts in Malaysia complain however
that the constitution, the NEP, and the Vision
2020 have not been innovative enough. Apart
from the absent British ruling stratum, in the
post-colonial context they reproduce and per-
petuate the old plural society with its spatial
separations, social inequalities, as well as its
economic dualism between Malays and non-
Malays (Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman,
1990: 18 ff.; Milner, 1998: 165 ff.) More spe-
cifically, these authors highlight above all the
constant socioeconomic predominance of the
non-Malay compared to the Malay population
that makes up the lower and socially weak strata
of society. From a more neutral point of view,
however, we can say that the different negotia-
tions and compromises concerning the ethni-
cally differentiated citizenship, as well as the
national policies conducted in their spirit, un-
til now have always sought to achieve a modus
vivendi between ethnic pluralism and economic
dualism. In fact, despite many defects and gaps
and defects of the consensual agreements, a
dynamic, subtle, laborious balance has been
maintained within the society inherited. Con-
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sider that the politics of ethnically differenti-
ated citizenship has guaranteed national cohe-
sion between ethnic components displaying
vertical social stratification due to very unequal
economic chances. Any evaluation of this poli-
tics should bear in mind the pertinent question
put by political scientist Milton Esman: with-
out such a consensually negotiated model of
ethnically differentiated citizenship,
Would the <...> Malays have been willing to tolerate the
consolidation of Chinese economic and professional he-
gemony without resorting to violence that would have been
far more costly to non Malays than the regime of moder-
ate discrimination that was actually implemented?
(Esman 1994; 74).
If the answer to Esman’s question is no, then
we can say that this politics not only is an im-
portant prerequisite of an economic success
regarded by many as outstanding, given how
the country got over the 1997 crisis, but has
also laid at least some foundations for what the
Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit has called
decent society  (Margalit, 1996).
Given how Malaysia has managed its vari-
ous problems regarding ethnic plurality, at first
it could appear as a paradigm set up against
Latvia. This would be the expression of a naive
and superficial view of the reality. In fact, the
Malaysian case is much differentiated and the
presentation regarding Penang is only one of
its aspects. Both the national identity construc-
tion and the notion of citizenship are based
upon the idea of ethnic plurality and
multiracialism. Thus, a State ideology and sev-
eral social practices in line with it, that mark-
edly celebrate differences, have ensued. Quite
often, there is a veritable folklorization of dif-
ference. Multiracialism as founding myth of the
Malaysian State and citizenship has certainly
avoided the various communities’ flight to-
wards forms of radical nationalism. In this con-
text, we can mention the case of the Chinese
who could have allied with their motherland’s
most extremist movements but were loyal to
their country of residence instead. As our re-
searches in Penang show as well, under the aus-
pices of multiracialism the following have de-
veloped at a local level and in everyday life:
“Interculturalism, documented by an increased com-
mensalism, intermarriages and inter-community busi-
nesses and postethnic associations called interest-based
organizations.” (Shamsul 2001; 208-209)
Nevertheless, the myth of multiracialism has
on the other hand maintained and entrenched
the boundaries between communities, a legacy
of the colonial regime, especially in certain ru-
ral areas and on the outskirts of large cities
such as Kuala Lumpur. In these, therefore, we
can detect an essentialization of ethnicity,
which, according to local experts, has given rise
to ethnic blocs.
This presentation wants to emphasize the
complex dialectic underlying every expression
of ethno-cultural plurality, rather than suggest
valuable solutions concerning a generalized citi-
zenship model. Solutions are always easy but
deceptive. Therefore, I would be glad to have
created a feeling of productive confusion, lit-
erally, a brainstorm.
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